In the case of Dougherty v Cole, Jr. the Defendant was convicted of first degree murder of his mother, by reason of insanity. His sister filed a petition to bar him from taking property under mother’s estate per Slayer Statute, and filed wrongful death action against him. Slayer Statute contains no exception for mental illness, thus Defendant’s conduct excluded him from inheriting from the mother’s estate. A beneficiary’s intentional and unjustifiable causing of death, regardless of criminality of the act, is sufficient to bar inheritance.

The court in Mostardi-Platt Associates, Inc v Czerniejewski held: a company that provides services that do not result in any improvement to land or in any benefit to the landowner, such as an environmental consulting company, are not the type of services for which a lien can be filed and enforced under Mechanics Lien Act. The court stated that the proper focus in determining the validity of a mechanic’s lien is whether the work actually enhanced the value of the land.

Senate Bill 2509, codified at 755 ILCS 5/16.2, provides the following:

A beneficiary of a trust may not be considered to be a settlor or to have made a transfer to the trust merely because of a lapse, release, or waiver of his or her power of withdrawal to the extent that the value of the affected property does not exceed the greatest of the amounts specified in Sections 2041(b)(2), 2514(e), and 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.

Practically speaking, this section simply clarifies the maximum amount that is allowed to pass to a Crummey Trust is the same under Illinois law as it it under the Internal Revenue Code.

The court in the case of Action Plumbing Company, Inc v Bendowski held that a subcontractor’s attorney fees cannot be taxed on subsequent purchasers of homes by including attorney fees in foreclosure actions, in violation of Mechanics Lien Act. The court stated that it was taxing attorney fees as against allegedly bankrupt developer, the developer had defaulted and thus was not in a position where it had to pay attorney fees to avoid any loss of interest.

In the case of Randle v Americash Loans, LLC, the Plaintiff took out a loan from the Defendant, which is a cash loan company. The Plaintiff filed suit alleging that company violated Truth in Lending Act and Illinois Interest Act by failing to disclose a security interest, because the Defendant’s loan documents had an electronic funds transfer authorization form, which authorized the company to automatically debit the Plaintiff’s checking account if Plaintiff defaulted on repayment. The loan documents did not include disclosure of the security interest. The court held that the loan documents, since they gave the Defendant the right to collect the debt upon default, must be disclosed as a security instrument.

Public Act 96-895, as of May 21, 2010, gives adults that were adopted access to their original birth certificates. For those born before January 1, 1946, they may access their original birth certificates immediately and for those born after January 1, 1946, they may access their original birth certificates after November 15, 2011. Birth parents have the right to remain anonymous.

In the case of Ernest v Chumley, step-children filed a complaint against their step-mother to determine their rights under a mutual will. A mutual will is generally regarded as one of two reciprocal wills that makes promises regarding the distribution of property upon the death of one of the spouses. This type of will is usually only used in situations where one of the spouses has children from a previous marriage and wants property to be distributed to them.

In this case, the mutual wills did not have any provision controlling the use of property during the lifetime of the surviving spouse. However, when the surviving spouse attempted to transfer proceeds from the sale of the home she owned with the deceased into certificates of deposit held jointly with her current spouse, the court opined that she breached the expressed intent of her mutual will by removing property from her estate.

In essence, the surviving spouse is welcome to use the funds from the estate of the deceased spouse in a situation involving mutual wills. However, the funds cannot be directed outside of the surviving spouses estate. In the interest of honoring the mutual wills, a surviving spouse must keep the funds within her estate.

The case of Board of Managers of Hidden Lake Townhome Owners Association v Green Trails Improvement Association shows the importance of understanding the difference between a license and a covenant. A license is permission to use another’s property, but is generally revocable or has a specific termination date. A covenant is a promise that runs with the land and is generally irrevocable. This case concerned a pathway that the home owner’s association could utilize, but contribute to maintenance. The agreement was only for 50 years. At the end of 50 years, the agreement regarding the pathway (a license) expired and neither party could enforce their interests based upon the original agreement. If the arrangement would have been a covenant. Then the agreement would have run with the land for an indefinite period of time.

The holding in First Mid-Illinois Bank & Trust v Parker, highlights a concern of the protections afforded by a limited liability company (LLC). In the case, the Plaintiff succeeded in having the court enter a judgment against the Defendants. To enforce the judgment, the Plaintiff joined an LLC in which the Defendants owned membership interests. 805 ILCS 180/30-20 states that a court “may charge the distributional interest of the [LLC member] to satisfy the judgment.” In addition, 805 ILCS 180/30-20 provides, “A charging order constitutes a lien on the judgment debtor’s distributional interest. The court may order a foreclosure of a lien on a distributional interest subject to the charging order at any time. . . .”

Furthermore, 735 ILCS 5/4-101 states:

In any court having competent jurisdiction, a creditor having a money claim, whether liquidated or unliquidated, and whether sounding in contract or tort, or based upon a statutory cause of action created by law in favor of the People of the State of Illinois, or any agency of the State, may have an attachment against the property of his or her debtor, or that of any one or more of several debtors, either at the time of commencement of the action or thereafter, when the claim exceeds $20, in any one of the following cases:
1. Where the debtor is not a resident of this State.
2. When the debtor conceals himself or herself or stands in defiance of an officer, so that process cannot be served upon him or her.
3. Where the debtor has departed from this State with the intention of having his or her effects removed from this State.
4. Where the debtor is about to depart from this State with the intention of having his or her effects removed from this State.
5. Where the debtor is about to remove his or her property from this State to the injury of such creditor.
6. Where the debtor has within 2 years preceding the filing of the affidavit required, fraudulently conveyed or assigned his or her effects, or a part thereof, so as to hinder or delay his or her creditors.
7. Where the debtor has, within 2 years prior to the filing of such affidavit, fraudulently concealed or disposed of his or her property so as to hinder or delay his or her creditors.
8. Where the debtor is about fraudulently to conceal, assign, or otherwise dispose of his or her property or effects, so as to hinder or delay his or her creditors.
9. Where the debt sued for was fraudulently contracted on the part of the debtor. The statements of the debtor, his or her agent or attorney, which constitute the fraud, shall have been reduced to writing, and his or her signature attached thereto, by himself or herself, agent or attorney.
10. When the debtor is a person convicted of first degree murder, a Class X felony, or aggravated kidnapping, or found not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill of first degree murder, a Class X felony, or aggravated kidnapping, against the creditor and that crime makes the creditor a “victim” under the Criminal Victims’ Asset Discovery Act.
11. When the debtor is referred by the Department of Corrections to the Attorney General under Section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections to recover the expenses incurred as a result of that debtor’s cost of incarceration.

When the statute provisions cited are read together, they allow for prejudgment attachment by a potential judgment creditor to preserve an LLC member’s distributional interest. Once a judgment is entered and a charging order is obtained, the order relates back to the date of the prejudgment attachment order for purposes of lien priority.

In light of the decision in Cook County Board of Review v Property Tax Appeal Board, if a violation of uniformity (an unfair assessment when considering the value of comparable properties) is proven by clear and convincing evidence to a property tax appeal board, then property is not equitably assessed for levying tax thereon and a new assessment must be given. This is true regardless of whether two condominium buildings have the same physical characteristics and percentage of ownership in the common elements. The assessments of the condominiums should not rest merely on these factors. Rather, the assessments of the condominiums should differ depending the means by which they had been subdivided or any other characteristics.